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OY ODSON AND JAM J. WI 
Strategic Denial and Deception 
A concern about the threat of high-level deniaLand deception has waxed and 
waned among Americans since the end of World War II. Sometimes they 
fear that denial and deception has shaped threat assessments: witness the 
1976 "A Team/B Team experiment" in q:nnpetitive intelligence analysis 
undertaken by the Gerald R. Ford Whit~ House. 1 At other times, the 
threat of denial and deception-here the euphoria accompanying the end 
of the Cold War comes to mind-seems to fade into insignificance. As the 
United States reigns as the only superpower and the world experiences a 
communication revolution, how much of a threat does denial and 
deception pose to American interests today? Do globalization, 
proliferating communication technologies, and the dissemination of vast 
amounts of information make effective foreign denial and deception more 
or less likely? Will more information and data sources make policymakers 
better informed or will the proliferation of information simply create 
confusion?2 
Dr. Roy Godson is a Professor of Govermnent at Georgetown University, 
founder of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, and nwst recently 
author of Dirty Tricks and Trump Cards, (2d ed., New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction, 2000 ). Dr. James J. Wirtz, an Associate Professor of 
National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
Cal~fornia is Progran1 Chainnan of the International Studies Association's 
Intelligence Studies Section. An earlier version of this article H'as presented 
at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Los 
Angeles, Cal?fornia, 14-18 lvf arch 2000. 
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Denial and deception is a term often used to describe a combination 
of information operations that a nation undertakes to achieve 
objectives. Denial refers to the attempt to block information which could 
be used by an opponent to learn some truth. Deception, by 
refers to a nation's effort to cause an adversary to believe something 
that is not true. 
Although they are distinct activities, denial and deception are intertwined 
practice and are used as a single concept here. deceive an opponent about 
the true intentions or goals of the deceiver, accurate information (e.g., 
about a military development program, a policy, a course of action, -etc.) 
must be concealed or "denied" to the target. Deception, the effort to 
cause an adversary to believe something that is not true, can 
undertaken together with denial operations. This involves using "leaks," 
planted information, or decoys to create the impression that the truth is 
other than it actually is, thereby creating an "alternative reality" for the 
target. When denial and deception works, the deceiver leads the target to 
believe a "cover story" rather than the truth. The target will then react in 
a way that serves the deceiver's interests. 
The term " more difficult to define, is used here to denote a 
high level of importance. D&D is strategic if it directly affects the 
national fortune and interests. Strategic denial and deception is related 
to the "big picture." It concerns the major policies of a government, 
rather than the details of policy implementation. Strategic deception is 
thus aimed at the highest levels of a government or of the military 
chain of command (e.g., chiefs of state, cabinet members, or senior 
military commanders). The subject of the deception effort must be 
something that a high-level official would deal "Yvith personally. Similarly, 
strategic denial would be the effort to withhold information of the sort 
that is handled primarily by senior officials. 
Foreign denial and deception occurs when state or non-state actors (e.g., 
terrorist groups, criminal organizations, or separatist movements) use 
denial and deception to achieve their objectives against U°'S. targets, 
interests, or policies. D&D also can be used by foreign adversaries as a 
strategic instrument in the sense that it becomes a primary means for 
disadvantaging the United States-politically or militarily. For terrorist or 
criminal organizations, D&D is a strategic instrument, much in the same 
way as the navy or nuclear weapons are strategic instruments for the 
United States. Criminals and terrorists use D&D as a strategic instrument 
to shape the environment so that they can better achieve their objectives. 
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Various "channels" of communication are used by practitioners. 
Sometimes intelligence sources and methods channel "corrupt" 
information to policymakers. Often, however, clandestine methods of 
communication are used: media (television, radio, Internet) outlets, 
diplomatic interactions, academic exchanges, and international travel and 
tourism. D&D does not require "dedicated" communication channels to 
be effective. In fact, D&D is often facilitated when the transfer of 
information appears to be incidental to the ostensible purpose of an event 
or contact. Diplomats, academics, and business travelers offer convincing 
conduits for the information they discover by "accident" during the 
regular course of their professional activities. 
Based on historical experience and deductive 'logic, a successful denial and 
deception campaign3 requires several components. First, the campaign 
benefits from strategic coherence. The deceiver nation must have an 
overall plan in mind for the achievement of its objectives; it must 
determine in advance how the target should behave .and how deception 
will contribute that outcome. The deceiver also must predict how the 
target will react in the wake of both successful and unsuccessful deception. 
This is no small task. Those contemplating deception may engage in 
wishful thinking when predicting the consequences of their deception 
campaign.4 Additionally, the deceiver must integrate its actions with (a) 
efforts to deny an opponent accurate information and (b) deceptive cover 
stories. Again, this is no small task. D&D campaigns require coherent, if 
not coordinated, action from many departments, agencies, or ministries. 
Public statements, press articles, and Internet communications must be 
shaped to support the goals of the nation intent on deception. As this 
corrupt information is disseminated, steps ml.1st be taken to prevent 
accurate information from reaching the target. -
Second, deception is enhanced when the strategic culture of the adversary is 
understood. To be successful, the deceiver must recognize the target's 
perceptual context5 to know what (false) pictures of the world will appear 
plausible. History, culture, bureaucratic preferences, and the general 
economic and political milieu all influence the target's perceptions. 6 False 
information should conform to the idiosyncrasies of strategic and even 
"t""\ll"t"'\111':11"" 0111t111-o [,lf~rtrilro.ci nrD an0;ly ~r-1 r1 11.f'lµrl •1"T""'-..,"'j'..;..l.•l1 ... r--r""'D,~rH11 lt" J:-1V_iJU..1.CL1 vUiLLH I,, • .LV.1..1.:JLC-U\..'vJ Cl!..._, 1..;ClJH ~~L ~ V.l L....,1 CL}'}'\.;Ul vV Ll.lvU.1 l-V 
the target audience.7 Thus, deception requires creative planning: experience 
shows that successful deception planners manage to escape the routine and 
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culture of large bureaucracies. In sum, deception planners "need to know a 
great deal about the worldview of those they are trying to manipulate, 
and recognize the human proclivity for self-deception. " 8 
Third, decepti011 requires information channels to reach the adversary. 
Supplying the target with corrupt information in creative ways can also 
increase its credibility in the eyes of the target. Deception planners thus 
require the authority and imagination to exploit traditional channels and 
develop new ones on an ad hoc basis. 
·Fourth, a successful D&D campaign benefits from feedback mechanisms to 
collect data about the target's behavior. Discove1)ng the way the target has 
interpreted the received ·data is especially important. A deception 
campaign is a dynamic enterprise: cover stories, communication channels, 
and specific initiatives require fine tuning to take advantage of unforeseen 
opportunities or problems. Knowing that a deception campaign is 
succeeding also can be crucial to the achievement of grand strategic 
objectives. To pursue a course of action that relied on deception if the 
target failed to "take the bait" would be foolhardy. Alternatively, if an 
initial deception plan failed, the feedback mechanism could activate 
backup D&D campaigns.9 
PRACTITIONERS OF DENIAL AND DECEPTION 
Deceivers can be divided into four categories: democracies; authoritarian 
regimes; regimes in transition (changing from authoritarian to democratic 
or vice versa); and non-state actors (criminal organizations, terrorist 
groups, separatist organizations). At one time or another, all types of 
actors launch (and suffer from) successful deception campaigns. 
Democracies 
Democracie_s employ D&D mostly in wartime. But democracies are quite 
capable of deceiving even in peacetime. From the Revolutionary War 
campaign at Yorktown, to the D-Da y landings in World War II, to the 
"feint" of a Marine amphibious assault during the Gulf War, United 
States history is replete with instances in which deception was used to 
U.S. military advantage. Throughout the twentieth century, Great Britain 
and other democracies also occasionally showed themselves to be effective 
at D&D in war and peace. For example, Israel's and, more recently, 
India's programs io develop nuclear weapons benefited from sophisticated 
D&D campaigns. But Americans are often unaware of the successful 
D&D campaigns of other democracies, especially in peacetime. 
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A uthoritarion Regimes 
contrast to democracies, authoritarian, and especially totalitarian, regimes 
use denial and deception as a regular instrument of governance. 10 
increases their reliance on similar tactics in foreign policy and defense 
matters. Especially disturbing . the tendency of authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes to use D&D to support the initiation of hostilities. 
For example, Operation (the 1941 Nazi invasion of the 
Soviet Union) and Japan's attack on the United States and Great Britain 
in December 1941 were accompanied by sophisticated D&D campaigns. 
Authoritarian regimes also are adept at other uses of D&D: witness Iraq's 
continuing efforts to elude international inspection and destruction of its 
weapons of mass destruction. 11 
Non-State Actors 
way non-state actors employ D&D poses a rising threat to U.S. interests 
and those of other democracies. Transnational businesses, criminal 
syndicates, revolutionary organizations, terrorists, and religious groups 
pursuing illicit objectives must seek cover to operate effectively. For 
criminals, rebels, and terrorists denial becomes their raison d'etat. The 
shadowy world of the terrorist or the criminal is an alternative reality, not 
a temporary expedient to achieve limited objectives. The criminal 
flourishes in the hidden world created by denial, while the gunman uses 
denial and deception to enter the world of legitimate power. The 
clandestine underground is a way of life and a strategic instrument for 
highly illicit organizations. 
For clandestine groups, denial creates a parallel world that exhilarates, 
offers a safe haven, and enhances the life of the committed. Evidence of 
this type of behavior can be observed both in the Sicilian Mafia, which 
se"el(s respect, power, and money, and in terrorist organizations that seek 
to change the direction of history through violent action. A cult may be 
perceived as benign by outsiders-witness how a group of Islamic 
extremists were generally ignored prior to their 1993 attack on New York 
City's World Trade Center, or how the Aum Shinrikiyo operated in 
Japan, Russia, and the United States with little interference from the 
authorities-until it uses violence to fulfill objectives hidden from even its 
own rank and file. 
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the resources of non-state actors. 12 These clandestine groups rarely can 
afford the time and resources needed for an effective deception campaign. 
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But as the activities of Colombia's the Republican and 
the Sicilian and U.S. Cos a N ostra crime families demonstrate, they have on 
occasion deliberately deceived as well as denied. 
When used by non-state actors, D&D poses an immediate threat. Scarce 
foreign aid and intelligence resources are often squandered against fake or 
insignificant issues. When criminals use D&D, police time is 
"chasing after shadows." Investigative efforts are diluted to the point 
where they no longer yield significant results. Criminals and political 
terrorists often use D&D to eliminate their competition or to misdirect 
law enforcement investigators. For example, analysts and 
pol1cymakers are alarmed about the fate of "starving sentries" at 
Soviet-built weapons plants and storage facilities. But, once out of 
spotlight, are senior Russian officials also conspiring to sell the inventories 
and infrastructures of those plants to the highest bidder? 
Regimes in Transition 
Some regimes are in transition from an authoritarian to a democratic form of 
government. Some seek to reverse the process, while others may seek to 
increase their foreign capabilities to alter the international status quo. 
When increasing their military capabilities, some powers are attracted to 
denial and deception as a means of protecting developing weapons and 
military infrastructures from outside interference or treaty commitments. 
The history of how transitional powers have exploited D&D offers insights 
into such contemporary problems as the 1998 collapse of the monitoring 
efforts of the United Nations Special Commission for the Disarmament of 
Iraq (UNSCOM). 
Decades earlier, during the interwar arms control and disarmament regime 
directed at the Weimar Republic, the Germans had obfuscated, if not 
actually hidden, their rearmament efforts from international inspectors. 
Sometimes individuals, most interested in their own pectiniary interests, 
hid existing stocks of weapons or manufacturing equipment on their own 
initiative. At other times, officials engaged in coordinated actiODS to hide 
activity forbidden by treaty. "Advertising Squadrons," whose ostensible 
purpose was to provide skywriting and advertising services, actually served 
in the late 1920s as the first operational units of the reborn German air force. 
The Inter-Allied Control Commission ( 1920-1926), charged with verifying 
German compliance with the Treaty of Versailles, became aware of these 
German violations. But because its inspectors failed to uncover convincing 
evidence of systematic German violation of the treaty, the Allies accepted 
the mundane explanations provided when evidence of wrongdoing was 
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME NUMBER 4 
430 ROY GODSON AND JAMES J. WIRTZ 
uncovered. the Control Commission concluded work in 1 
example, Commander Fanshawe, a British naval inspector, told his 
German counterpart: "You should not feel that we believed what you told 
us. Not one word you uttered was true, but you delivered information in 
such a clever way that we were in a position to believe you. I want to 
thank you for this." 13 
Parallels exist between German rearmament and the recent UNSCOM 
experience in Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. Over time, plausible, if 
unlikely, explanations offered by the Iraqis for apparent arms violations 
eroded international interest and commitment in pursuing evidence of 
weapons violations. No one seems to believe that Iraq is in compliance 
with United Nations mandates, but most governments are reluctant to act 
against murky evidence of arms violations. 
Thus, transition regimes are advantaged because nations 
easy way out" by believing palatable lies and half truths rather than confront 
disturbing information. 14 may· also apply to other of denial 
and deception. 
The United States, several reasons, is likely to be a target of denial and 
deception by a variety of state and nonstate actors. First, D&D can ·be 
viewed as a form of asymmetric warfare. Likely opponents lack the 
military capability needed to effectively challenge U.S. forces on the 
battlefield. For the most part, officers and policymakers in the United 
States are preoccupied by asymmetric threats in the form of new 
technology or weapons (e.g., using advanced sensors and microprocessors 
to upgrade the performance of primitive mines). 
But asymmetric warfare does not have to be based on exotic technology or 
be intended to exploit technical weaknesses i_n U.S. weapons systems. 
Denial and deception, for example, allows adversaries to compensate for 
American superiority by delaying U.S. military action or by confronting 
policymakers with a fait accompli. In other words, opponents might hope 
to avoid confronting U.S. forces directly by increasing the costs of U.S. 
intervention. D&D also might prevent U.S. forces from creating the 
synergy in maneuver and firepower needed to overcome numerically 
superior opponents on the battlefield. Because U.S. forces increasingly 
depend on superior command, control, comnrnnication, and intelligence 
(C4I) to beat an adversary to the punch, opponents can expect to reap 
disproportionate benefits from a D&D attack on American C4I. 
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Second, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 1s 
facilitated by technologies or contraband materials and 
equipment are needed for the manufacturing of chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons. Most states and manufacturers are unlikely to supply 
well-known proliferators with sensitive equipment. But can used 
to avoid the international condemnation and sanctions that would follow 
clear evidence that a nation was seeking to develop an arsenal of 
unconventional weapons. As Israel's June 1981 preventive attack on Iraq's 
nuclear complex at Osirak demonstrates, a WMD infrastructure that is 
detected before weapons are readied faces the prospect of direct military 
action. D&D helps proliferators hide their activities and avoid 
international sanctions or military strikes intended to deny them 
arsenals. 
the United States is party to a record number of multilateral and 
bilateral arms control, human rights, and trade agreements. Because many 
of these treaties involve complex ·verification and compliance procedures, 
states seeking to violate these treaties will be tempted to use 
Multilateral treaties are especially vulnerable to this type of threat. 
international community would be unlikely to abandon an international 
arms control (e.g., the chemical weapons convention) because 
suspicions are aroused that a state is failing to abide by its terms. The 
history of the interwar Inter-Allied Control Commission would suggest 
that political will is at a premium when it comes to sanctioning violators 
of multilateral regimes. 
Fourth, the electronic media, especially all-news television networks and 
Internet coverage, provide new channels for D&D. Although these new 
media allow Americans to stay informed about global developments in 
real time, they provide adversaries with a way to communicate directly 
with U.S. citizens and elites. This access can provide adversaries with an 
advantage over. efforts of the U.S. government to communicate its policy 
positions to a domestic or a global audience. The public, especially under 
authoritarian regimes, rarely has access to new communication technology. 
In many respects, American government officials and the public are now 
part of a national village that often shares the same "virtual" experience, 
especially when it comes to extraordinary events. 
To the extent that these images can be manipulated by foreign agents, new 
forms of media provide new opportunities for D&D. If Vietnam was the 
first television war, and the Gulf conflict was the first war with real time 
global coverage, then 1999 \Var in Kosovo was the first "interactive 
war." Although not very sophisticated, supporters of Serbia used the 
Internet to contact individual Americans directly, while Serbian officials 
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debated various talk show hosts on national television. These techniques are 
likely to become more sophisticated in the future. 
Fifth, the dissemination of knowledge about intelligence technology 
and an increased technological sophistication among U.S. opponents, 
aided in part by the intimate and powerful experience of having done 
battle with U.S. armed forces, is increasing foreign awareness of U.S. 
intelligence sources and methods. In addition, the publication of 
heretofore classified information supplied by officials and unofficial 
"leaks" can be, and has been, used by diligent adversaries to understand 
U.S. inteIIigence capabilities and biases. Intelligence sources and methods 
have been further compromised by espionage incidents and diplomatic 
demarches. This information has made it possible for adversaries to target 
the U.S. intelligence community for denial and deception. 
Sixth, globalization-the breakdown of the traditional barriers to national 
sovereignty-increases the information and economic channels that can be 
used to conduct D&D. Tourism, business travel, legal and illegal 
migration, legal and illegal international trade, and increasingly interactive 
global financial markets and instruments offer subtle and credible ways to 
communicate corrupt information. Simultaneously, global financial 
markets and commerce form a new and profitable venue for D&D 
operations. The successful manipulation of financial markets and 
commerce not only undermines confidence in economic institutions, but 
can adversely affect the quality of life of many Americans, including their 
investments and pension plans. 
MINIMIZING THREATS 
Although the threat of D&D cannot be eliminated, there are ways to minimize 
its adverse impact: (1) develop a program to increase awareness in U.S. 
government circles of the use and methods of D&D efforts; (2) increase 
public and media awareness of D&D; · (3) increase awareness of the 
trade-offs entailed in revealing current U.S. collection and analytic 
methods; ( 4) train intelligence collectors, analysts, and managers; and (5) 
synthesize available knowledge and prepare for the future. These , 
initiatives require only modest expenditures of resources and effort, but 
they may yield significant dividends. 
Increased Government Awareness 
target or channel for D&D. This simple recommendation is, however, difficult 
to put into practice. Elected and senior officials pride themselves on their 
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interpersonal skills. people, they to on their own ability to 
accurately perceive their surroundings and to sense when they are being 
manipulated. J\1oreover, senior officials ofte~1 tend to place more stock in 
their own personal observations, even if limited, than in a mountain of 
contradictory information. There may be more than a little truth to the 
proposition that the more the politician, the less likely he/ she will 
be concerned about being targeted by a denial and deception campaign. 
Increasing awareness among elected officials and other policymakers of 
use and methods may be facilitated by case studies. By providing 
examples of past and current D&D activities, they could serve as a 
powerful reminder of their potential damage to interests,_ especially 
when targeted against elected and appointed officials. 
further prevent policymakers from falling victim to 
can provide policymakers with additional, 
background information on their personal contacts and sources of 
information so as to place them in a more complete context. 
Public and Media Awareness 
The American public, and especially the mass media, can be made aware that 
they are · targeted by D&D efforts, whether to be used as a channel 
of to reach elected officials, or to shape broad political 
trends and opinion in the United States. Foreign officials planning 
deception will naturally have an interest in capturing public and media 
opinion in a democracy. But to exaggerate threat posed by D&D 
would be counterproductive. Instead, accurate and consistent explanation 
that adversaries are interested in shaping public and media opinion to 
serve their own interests can sensitize individuals to the possibility that 
they are being manipulated. Awareness of hO\v past, current, and possibly 
future D&D has targeted the media and other nongovernmental sectors 
will help minimize the effectiveness of strategic foreign deception efforts. 
Awareness of Revealing Information on Intelligence Methods 
Government officials are often placed in situations where there is an advantage 
in revealing information, either to the public or to other governments, 
containing insights into U.S. intelligence collection and analytic methods 
and capabilities. While decisions on whether or not to reveal certain 
information must be made on a case-by-case basis, officials need to be 
avvare of the trade=offs involved. In particular, providing other 
governments, international bodies, or non-state actors with indications 
concerning intelligence methods may facilitate the conduct of D&D 
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against the United States. in a pos1t10n make such as 
as other officials and the public, can and should be made aware of how 
their actions could affect U.S. intelligence sources and methods, and 
ability of the United States to detect future operations. addition, 
adequate records concerning such of information must be 
maintained to help determine what foreign governments or non-state 
actors are likely to know about U.S. intelligence methods and capabilities 
that could help them plan their operations. 
Training Intelligence Collectors, Analysts, and Managers 
Intelligence collectors, analysts, and managers must bec<?me more aware of the. 
possibility of their being and channels for Education, 
and training could include case studies of successful 
especially those involving the extensive use of technical · 
channels. Specific elements of a 
e enhancing an awareness of the extent to which technical intelligence 
sources and methods may be compromised to what extent 
does the intelligence target and potential deceiver understand the 
operation of a given inteIIigence channel?); 
c; developing and implementing a rating system for technical intelligence· 
collection comparable to that which exists for human source collection 
(e.g., whether collection is "expected" or "unexpected," degree of 
compromise of the channel, etc.); 
• examining possible "feedback" channels a potential deceiver might 
use, including analysis of open source information (e.g., what 
information could a potential deceiver glean from official 
statements and actions?). 
Increased Study of D&D l-!istory and Theory 
The study of historical, theoretical, and foreign D&D should be fostered 
within the Intelligence C9mmunity. A great deal of intellectual capital was 
accumulated during the Cold War on how to assess and counter D&D. 
Many of these lessons can be used to anticipate current and future 
challenges. But the generation that developed counter-denial and 
counter-deception awareness and practices in the aftermath of World War 
II is passing from the scene. 
The few specialists remaining active are available, and usually willing, to 
work with a new generation of counter-D&D practitioners and 
knowledge and foster new studies of effective practices and indicators of 
D&D activity. network of these specialists could be maintained and 
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provided with an opportunity to help mentor scholars, research corporation 
analysts, and intelligence managers and trainers. addition, the 
synthesizing and publishing of studies, and the holding of conferences on 
D&D in other countries are likely to provide insights, not only on past 
practices but on anticipated threats. 
MINIMIZING 
Foreign denial and deception affects the quality of life in the United States by 
causing policymakers to waste scarce public resources and to fail to 
strategic threats. · assists state and 
actors abroad, and even facilitates illegal activity in the Western 
and U.S. border regions. Intelligence Community, the 
and other government as well as elected 
officials, the media, and the public need to be aware of efforts to influence 
policy debates and priorities within the United States. cannot be 
eliminated, but its impact can be minimized. 
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